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1 Introduction
Chinese agriculture engagement in the African
continent is growing rapidly and having an
increasing impact on African development and
agrarian change. This trend is often portrayed as
a threat to the continent’s development – part of
a protracted effort to oust both Western and
African control over land and politics on the
continent. Chinese leaders, however, claim that
their engagement is not only good for African
agriculture, but also good for the entire world
through support for Africa’s potential to address
global food security, and further, that their
unique approach to aid is leading to a ‘modern
revival of developing countries’ worldwide. As
one senior economist at China Exim explained in
an interview:
Traditional development actors are really out
of touch with the realities on the ground. So
we decided to do something radically different
and very quickly, to be a catalyst for changes
and reforms. This represents a radically
different approach to engagement with Africa,
an approach that can be called a paradigm
revolution.
This article explores the contours of this
revolution in the context of engagements in
African agriculture, and asks what conversations
are currently developing across various circles in
Beijing on the subject.
2 Narratives of engagement
China’s increasing engagement with African
agriculture – through aid, trade and investments
throughout the continent – is now a well-
documented trend (Scoones et al., this IDS
Bulletin). The nature and significance of these
engagements, however, continues to be hotly
debated in media, academic and policy circles
around the world. Three primary divergent
narratives describing China’s engagement in
Africa can be summarised as follows: China as
coloniser, economic competitor or development
partner (Alden 2007: 5).
The first two framings prevail in the media,
emphasising China’s engagement as a threat to
Africa’s development, especially in land and
resource-related engagements such as
agriculture. They present China’s recent wave of
aid and diplomatic efforts in Africa as part of a
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protracted effort to oust both Western and
African control over land and politics on the
continent. The second narrative sees China
engaged in a self-interested, exploitative grab for
resources to feed its fast-paced growth. In Winner
Take All: China’s Race for Resources, Dambisa Moyo
admires China’s ‘commodity campaign’,
describing it as ‘breathtaking,’ stating that ‘The
Chinese are on a global shopping spree’ in a
zero-sum world of finite resources, and arguing
that China’s ‘voracious commodity appetite is
unlikely to abate’ (Moyo 2012: 3).
Counter to these ‘threat’ framings, the
development partner framing highlights the
opportunities presented by China’s engagement
with African countries, emphasising the value of
China’s development experience for
transforming Africa through South–South
collaborative efforts. This development partner
framing is seen in multilateral organisations,
academic literature, as well as Chinese and
African government discourse. In agriculture
cooperation specifically, China is presented as a
success story, ready to partner with African
countries to support their success. For example,
the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) argues that ‘Chinese science
and agriculture have much to offer to other
developing countries, since intensive small-scale
agriculture has been practised in China for
centuries,’ and points out that ‘China repeatedly
demonstrated its commitment to helping other
developing countries to improve their food
security’ (FAO 2012). Discussing China’s
engagement in African agriculture, the
literature has attempted to debunk myths about
so-called large-scale Chinese farming for export.
It has repeatedly argued that the scale of China’s
engagement is still unclear but likely to be much
smaller than claimed (Smaller et al. 2012;
Brautigam and Tang 2012a; Scissors 2010), and
that most production is currently not exported
(Buckley 2012; Brautigam 2009).
China’s engagement in African agriculture
development thus remains highly contested.
Despite an increasing body of more thoughtful,
evidence-based research looking into the nature
of these engagements, there is a persistent lack
of analysis of Chinese perspectives. Whether
seen as a threat or opportunity, ‘China’ is
generally portrayed as a monolith, guided by a
strong policy directive and ruled by a central
coordinating force in Beijing. For example,
Deborah Brautigam writes that China’s
‘embrace of the continent is strategic, planned,
long-term and still unfolding’ (2012: 7).
The debate on the implications of this Sino-
African cooperation in agriculture, however, will
not be resolved without a deeper understanding
of the diversity of Chinese agriculture
engagements in specific African contexts, and
the nature of Chinese narratives on the subject.
3 China–Africa agriculture cooperation
China has been involved in African agriculture
for more than 40 years. Early engagement was
largely motivated by a need for the new Chinese
nation to build soft power and recognition on the
global stage. Activities were characterised by
bilateral agreements and donation-based aid. In
return for their friendship and assistance,
countries had to adhere to the ‘One China’
policy, which required countries to recognise
Taiwan as part of the People’s Republic of China.
These efforts played an important role in
China’s successful bid for a UN seat and they
remain important allies in international
negotiations (Renard 2011: 7, 12). The One
China policy is still in effect today.
During China’s Reform Period in the 1980s and
1990s, engagements in Africa took a
‘consolidation’ approach focusing on science and
techniques implemented by joint venture-
supported grants (Brautigam and Tang 2012b).
In recent years, following China’s joining of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
launch of its official ‘Go Out’ policy in the early
2000s, China’s focus has shifted to support for
Africa’s economic liberalisation and integration
into the global agriculture commodity market.
This has meant support for development of
export-oriented production, experimentation
with Special Economic Zones (Renard 2011;
Berthelemy 2011), exemptions from customs
duties, large infrastructure projects, and Chinese
ODI in Africa (Renard 2011: 20). These
engagements still include bilateral and aid-based
approaches, but are increasingly characterised by
multilateral and regional engagements, and by
mixed aid-trade-investment packages.
In this article, China–Africa agriculture
‘cooperation’ is understood broadly to include not
just aid, but also investments and trade. Chinese
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engagements themselves deliberately blur the
lines between grant-based aid, investment and
trade, and involve an increasingly complex array
of actors. To understand Chinese discourse on
the subject, it is useful to first situate it within
the history and current nature of China–Africa
cooperation in agriculture, as well as the
institutions and primary actors governing these
engagements.
3.1 Historical context and current drivers
In early forays into the international scene,
Chinese officials – led by Mao and his anti-
imperialist agenda – were quick to assert that
China was distinct from colonial powers and that
it came in friendship and solidarity. Today this
has evolved into China’s assertion of itself as ‘the
largest developing country in the world’
(GOV 2010: 2) which is providing assistance to
African countries ‘despite its own economic
hardship’ (GOV 2010: 5). Emphasising their
shared challenge of development, Chinese
leaders thus assert a moral imperative to share
their experience as they show ‘great concern for
the livelihoods of African people’ (GOV 2010: 7).
Indeed, China’s own modernisation project grew
out of a sense of indignation at its perceived
mistreatment by the West. The result has been a
deep belief among leaders that China needed to
forge its own path towards modernisation, a path
independent and distinct from that of the West.
China’s insistence on not interfering in domestic
political affairs of other countries stems from
this experience. As then Chinese president Hu
Jintao stated in the recent Forum on
China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) ministerial
conference in Beijing, ‘China wholeheartedly and
sincerely supports African countries choosing
their own development path, and will
wholeheartedly and sincerely support them to
raise their development ability’ (CCTV 2012).
China’s approach to Africa has been to
experiment with the approach China has taken
to modernise and liberalise its own rural
economy. Agriculture played a central role in
China’s own economic development and sharing
these experiences has been a consistent priority
in China’s engagements in Africa (Li et al., this
IDS Bulletin). Agriculture cooperation has
focused on technocratic and capacity-building
interventions, and deliberately shied away from
social and political issues. Since launching its ‘Go
Out’ policy and joining the WTO in 2001, China
has promoted itself as an active member of the
global community, encouraging agricultural
trade and overseas direct investments. Chinese
leaders still see the global community as unfairly
dominated by a small handful of countries at the
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Table 1 Formal agenda of China–Africa agriculture cooperation
Beijing Action Plan (2012–2015)
Sections Pledged actions by China
4.1.3 Support CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme) for a ‘growth-
oriented’ agricultural agenda for Africa
4.1.4 Send teams to train African agricultural technicians
4.1.4 Support agricultural vocational education system and send teachers
4.1.4 & 5.2.1 Build more agriculture demonstration centres
4.1.4 Provide technical support for grain planting, storage, processing and circulation
4.1.4 & 4.5.6 Encourage Chinese financial institutions to support corporate cooperation in planting, 
processing, animal husbandry, fisheries and aquaculture
4.1.4 Support UNFAO ‘Special Program for Food Security’
4.1.4 & 4.1.6 Facilitate access for African agricultural products to the Chinese market
4.5.2 US$20 billion credit line for infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and African SMEs
6.3.6 Publish and translate agricultural technology materials; joint participation in book fairs in China 
and Africa
Source FOCAC (2012).
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expense of the vast majority. They consistently
reject OECD aid models, interpreting the use of
conditionalities as ‘merely the latest in the
decades of humiliating experiences at the hands
of former colonial powers and the United States’
(Alden 2007: 20).
The message is clear: Chinese agriculture did not
get where it is today through DAC-guided aid. It
got here through a mix of market reforms, trade,
and foreign direct investment (FDI), and that is
precisely what it is doing in Africa. The result is a
focus on providing ‘multi-level and multi form
cooperation’ to contribute to improving agriculture
production, strengthening Africa’s food security,
technical exchanges, human resources training,
agriculture development plans, and agriculture
processing and machinery (FOCAC 2012). This
includes a commitment to ‘encourage Chinese
financial institutions to support corporate
cooperation’ in agriculture development.
Chinese engagement in global agriculture is also
guided by changing consumption patterns in
China and increasing resource pressures on an
overtaxed domestic agriculture sector. Though
China has been highly successful at feeding more
than 20 per cent of the world’s people with only
9 per cent of its arable land, its leaders are ‘not
optimistic about its food security situation’ as the
country ‘faces shrinking arable land resources,
water shortages, frequent disasters,
deteriorating arable land quality and other
agricultural production challenges including
climate change’ (Li et al. 2012: 245).
Agriculture engagement in Africa today is framed
as ‘South–South’ collaboration, emphasising
reciprocal relationships with ‘mutual benefits’. It
continues to enhance political relationships and
soft power, while also boosting commercial
opportunities for national firms, and increasingly
also serves to strengthen Chinese resource
security (Brautigam and Tang 2012b; Brautigam
2012; Li et al. 2012; Qi 2012; Renard 2011). It also
continues to be informed by China’s own
domestic development experience and shaped by
policy changes within African countries and by
global economic trends (Li et al. 2012).
3.2 Cooperation principles, modalities and trends
The details of China’s current pledges to African
agriculture are listed in Table 1.
To the Chinese leadership, economic and trade
cooperation is a prerequisite for ‘promoting
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Figure 1 Chinese institutions in China–Africa agriculture cooperation 
Source Author’s own.
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economic development and social progress’
(GOV 2010: 2). Chinese ministries, banks and
companies are thus all involved in agriculture
cooperation with African countries. Though
there are at least 23 ministries and agencies
involved in these engagements (Kragelund
2008), key institutions and actors and their
relationships are outlined in Figure 1.
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) plays a
central role through its Department of Foreign
Aid and Department of Outward Investment and
Economic Cooperation. MOFCOM coordinates
with the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for
agriculture programmes, which are then
implemented by Chinese institutes, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and private firms through a
competitive bidding process. Financing for the
implementation is partially sourced from the
China Development Bank (CDB) and the
Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim) in
the form of commercial development finance and
export credit. The China–Africa Development
Fund (CADFund) was established in 2006 to
promote the development of Sino-African
commercial ties. It has a strategic agreement
with the China State Farm Agribusiness
Corporation to establish a joint company to
make agriculture investments.
FOCAC was established in 2000 to provide an
interface with African partners and relevant
Chinese actors. FOCAC ministerial meetings are
held every three years alternating between
Beijing and African countries and continue to
provide an important policy framework and
platform for engagement. Increasingly, Chinese
NGOs and researchers are developing interest in
these engagements as well, and are beginning to
explore ways to influence key actors and policies
governing them.
It can be difficult to obtain reliable data on the
scale and depth of China–Africa agriculture
cooperation. This is further complicated by the
fact that assistance to Africa is administered by
at least two dozen agencies and ministries
(Kragelund 2008). Where aid projects are
explicitly discussed in Chinese government and
media reports, the tendency is to emphasise
impacts on the ground, for example, citing
numbers of infrastructure projects built,
trainings held, or people treated for a disease. As
a whole, this aid is growing fast; however, it is
still relatively small compared to aid from OECD
countries (Grimm et al. 2011). Davies estimated
total aid to Africa between 1949 and 2006 to be
valued at US$5.6 billion (Davies 2006). Aid flows
on a yearly basis have also produced a wide range
of estimates such as: US$1–1.5 billion in 2005
(Wang 2007); or US$850 million in 2007
(Brautigam 2012; Axel et al. 2011; Kragelund
2008).
According to the State Council, by the end of
2009 China had 142 agriculture projects in
Africa and had provided ‘a large amount’ of
agriculture equipment and materials (GOV
2010: 7). Agriculture aid comes in both monetary
and in-kind forms to support food production,
breeding, storage and transport, and
infrastructure development, as well as in the
form of agriculture equipment, trainings,
technical assistance and scholarships (GOV
2010: 7). Chinese banks play a key role as well,
offering financing services in agriculture and
financing agriculture development projects
(Brautigam 2012; Berthelemy 2011: 11).
Although aid is not tied to governance or policy
requirements in recipient countries, China only
provides aid to countries that recognise the One
China policy – currently 49 countries in Africa
(Brautigam 2012). Commercial interests can
also be seen in China’s monetary aid which is
tied to the use of Chinese goods and services.
Indeed, Chinese ‘aid’ has often been criticised as
being tied to commodities, with large lines of
export buyers’ credit sometimes secured with
commodities, especially in resource-rich
countries such as Angola, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea.
These act as a kind of complicated long-term
trade arrangement, with financing up front
(Brautigam 2011).
Trade has been rising in significance since 1974
following Chinese liberalisation (Renard 2011).
Total trade between China and Africa has grown
rapidly, from US$12.14 million in 1950 to US$1
billion in 1980, then US$10 billion in 2000 to a
reported US$100 billion in 2008 (GOV 2010: 3).
Recent Ministry of Commerce figures put trade
at US$166.3 billion in 2011 (Mu 2012; PDO
2011). China emphasises its role as a ‘stable
market’ for African exports, especially of ‘local
specialities’ (GOV 2010: 3), and has provided
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zero tariff imports of a wide range of agriculture
goods from 45 Least Developed Country partners
since 2005.
Investment is also increasing rapidly, covering
49 African countries in a wide range of sectors by
a diversity of actors including SOEs, private
enterprises and individuals (GOV 2010: 4). In 2011,
Chinese investments in Africa were calculated at
US$14.7 billion from over 2,000 enterprises (Mu
2012), and agriculture has been identified as a
‘core’ focus for future investments (Ncube 2012).
Chinese agriculture investment figures have also
been a source of much confusion, with many
large-scale, food crop investment proposals being
cited as operational Chinese ‘land grabs’ for
export back to China. Increasing evidence,
however, suggests that China is not engaged in
large-scale African farming for export
(Brautigam and Tang 2012a; Scissors 2010;
Large 2008). Smaller et al. (2012) were only able
to confirm the existence of 54 Chinese overseas
projects covering 4.9 million hectares of land. Of
those 54 projects worldwide, only 32 (covering
1.4 million hectares) are operational and only
463,792 hectares (9 per cent) are in Africa.
Overall, focusing on the aggregate size of
Chinese aid, trade and investment masks the
diversity of Chinese agricultural engagements
and fosters misunderstanding. It also tells us
little about why these engagements are
happening, and what the impacts are.
4 Discourses on China–Africa cooperation
To build such an understanding of the patterns
and motivations underlying Chinese agriculture
cooperation with Africa, it is useful to analyse
how different Chinese actors talk about these
engagements, how they envision African
agriculture, and how they understand China’s
place in global agriculture and food security.
Discussions with around 30 informants about
China–Africa cooperation were undertaken,
including Chinese nationals posted in Africa,
officials involved in policymaking alongside civil
society, media and diplomatic representatives.
4.1 Framing China–Africa cooperation
In the Beijing Action Plan drawn up in the 2012
FOCAC ministerial conference in Beijing,
Chinese leaders set out their vision and plan for
China–Africa cooperation over the next five
years (FOCAC 2012). Table 2 lists the frequency
of select terms used in this document.
This sense of solidarity and shared development
opportunities with Africa was emphasised in
many interviews. As a consultant in a Chinese
overseas investment consulting firm explained,
‘Chinese companies do well in Africa because we
come from a developing country and we have
ways of dealing with certain issues [that also
apply in Africa]. They are in a poverty trap.
China faced exactly the same problem 100 years
ago.’ A Chinese agronomist who had worked in a
Sino-Senegalese agriculture training programme
reasoned, ‘Our experts and technicians are all
hard-working and can endure hardship. They’ve
been through difficult times in China’s recent
past, so Africa is not such a difficult adjustment
for them.’
The sense that China has unique development
experience to offer is also echoed in discourse of
non-Chinese actors. For example, Zambian
writer Dambisa Moyo (2010) asserts that the
OECD aid model has failed African countries
and suggests that China’s approach offers a
meaningful path forward. A China Exim
economist explains, ‘The urgent need for
Africans is to feed their bellies, so social justice
needs to be above political democracy’.
In the White Paper on China–Africa Economic
and Trade Cooperation issued by FOCAC in 2010,
China’s leadership asserts that China’s approach
to Africa ‘infuses new life’ into South–South
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Table 2 Frequency of select phrases used in FOCAC
Action Plan 2012
Phrase Occurrences*
cooperation 140
two sides 132
developing/-ment 75
exchange 68
mutual/joint/together 49
strengthen/benefit 41
agriculture 28
food security 11
* Of 877 distinct words used.
Source Author’s own.
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cooperation while ‘promoting the establishment of
a fair and rational new international political and
economic order’ (GOV 2010: 2).
4.2 Technological and market optimism
China’s approach to Africa has been to
experiment with the approach China has taken to
modernise and liberalise its own rural economy.
Chinese agriculture cooperation tends to be
heavily technocratic because this has been China’s
experience too – to focus on technology and
market development, and allow different Chinese
regions to adapt specific uses to their own needs.
Many informants emphasised the importance of
technology. In addition to the ‘hard’ technologies
of irrigation, Chinese crop varieties, and farm
equipment, agriculture cooperation also focuses
on the ‘soft’ technologies of capacity building and
skills transfer. Other informants pointed to market
barriers in Africa which they perceived to be
preventing agriculture development. A leading
economist at China Exim, for example, explained
that agriculture cooperation with Africa should
not just be about transferring Chinese techniques
– it also needed to focus on the market. The
Chinese leadership and investors also have an
interest in stabilising markets in Africa because,
as one Chinese investment consultant notes,
‘Market volatility represents a major risk for
Chinese investment in African agriculture.’
4.3 Solving global food security
Although Chinese leaders believe deeply in their
approach to agricultural modernisation, and in
the effectiveness of their technologies and global
markets to support them, they are less optimistic
about the future potential of additional domestic
agriculture growth. Chinese policymakers think
better food self-sufficiency in Africa will reduce
others’ dependence on international agricultural
markets, and thereby also ease China’s own
situation (Li et al. 2012). The FOCAC White
Paper explains, ‘China always regards helping
Africa solve its food security problem as its
ultimate goal in China–Africa agriculture
cooperation’ (GOV 2010: 7). The Chinese
agronomist in Senegal explained, ‘China has
relatively little arable land compared to other
countries but an enormous population, and yet
we have been able to rely on our own abilities to
feed ourselves. We can use this experience to
help solve [Africa’s] food supply problems.’ The
argument that Chinese technologies and
experience might be used to address global food
security is increasingly echoed in the
international development community as well
(Bo et al. 2013; Brautigam and Tang 2011).
Informants rejected the notion that China–Africa
agriculture cooperation is purely for China’s self-
interest, asserting that though China does have a
food security problem, the focus is on addressing
global food security as a global, holistic issue, not
for growing food in Africa for direct export to
China. The agriculture policy advisor at the
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) similarly
explained: ‘Media coverage of these issues is very
biased. China is helping Africa improve global
food security. China does want to increase food
exports from Africa, but not necessarily directly
to China’.
5 Alternative narratives
While mainstream Chinese discourse on
China–Africa agriculture cooperation focuses on
the mutual advantages of each side and the
opportunities these create, some actors are
developing more critical perspectives and
offering alternative frameworks for thinking
about China–Africa agriculture cooperation.
5.1 Technology transfer in a vacuum
Not everyone agrees that Chinese technology is
appropriate for Africa, or indeed that China’s
development experience can be adapted to
Africa’s benefit. Informants criticised the
assumptions of shared experience between
China and Africa. As a project officer of a
Chinese grassroots NGO, worried, ‘Aid is
supposed to help local people develop by
introducing China’s experience. But people
forget to ask whether this is appropriate or not.
Chinese people don’t understand African history
or the development situation.’ The agriculture
policy advisor at CAS similarly suggests that
Chinese agriculture technology transfer has ‘not
been very effective because Chinese workers
don’t understand Africa.’ In short, he says, ‘Africa
doesn’t understand China, and China doesn’t
understand Africa.’
This lack of understanding is further compounded
by the Chinese tendency to segregate themselves
from local populations when implementing a
project, leading to misunderstandings and racism.
Misunderstandings have developed on both sides.
A researcher at the Beijing-based Center for
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International Agriculture Cooperation and
Development argued that Chinese efforts:
… constantly run into cultural conflicts of
language, religion, and even work habits… It
is true that international organizations and
media don’t understand China. But a lot of
Chinese actors also don’t understand a lot of
things about Africa. Chinese agriculture aid
and investments are both good and bad.
5.2 Cooperation towards what kind of agriculture?
Also of concern was that China’s own agriculture
development was creating problems, and that
lessons from these issues were not being carried
forward into cooperation with Africa. A Chinese
NGO project officer argued that in Africa, ‘the
average land to person ratio is quite high, so
there’s no real need to use China’s model of high
investment, high polluting agriculture.’
Similarly, the CAS economist argued that
‘handing out technologies won’t have any take
up. We’ve seen this with the experience of biogas
in China.’ The agriculture policy advisor at CAS
was equally critical of the emphasis on
technology transfer above other factors, ‘The
Gates Foundation is spending US$1 billion on
agriculture technology for Africa. But not all
technology is necessarily useful for Africa. In
China, rural development started with land
tenure reform, not with technology.’
There is also concern that Chinese actors may be
having unintended social impacts through their
focus on the government leaders and elites. A
Chinese NGO worker commented: ‘Even where
China may have valuable models to share,’ she
said, ‘it is unclear whether the necessary training
reaches the right people.’ Informants also
recognise the problem of Chinese segregation,
suggesting that Chinese enterprises’ ‘top-down
management system’ makes them focus ‘greater
attention to maintaining good and strong
relations with local government representatives’
such that they ‘do not develop sufficient
connections with other local powerful
organizations, such as the labour unions, other
stakeholder groups, or NGOs’.
Informants in international NGOs in China
stressed the need to improve the governance of
social and environmental impacts of
China–Africa cooperation. Coverage of the
FOCAC meetings has not generally included the
environmental sector. ‘The ideal would be that
Chinese investments would create minimum
environmental impacts and provide direct
benefits to local communities. We also hope to
achieve formal NGO participation in future
FOCAC meetings’, commented an international
NGO representative. A Chinese NGO officer
commented: ‘Our focus is on how to protect the
farmers’ interests. I believe that we need to
support grassroots organizations in Africa and in
China to be able to find sustainable solutions.
There’s a need for greater disclosure of
information in order to help Chinese groups be
more aware of these issues and collaborate to
find solutions.’
6 Conclusion
China’s leadership asserts that China’s approach
to Africa ‘infuses new life’ into South–South
cooperation, ‘elevates the political and economic
status of developing countries in the world,’ and
contributes significantly to ‘promoting the
establishment of a fair and rational new
international political and economic order’ (GOV
2010: 2). Chinese agriculture engagements are
redefining the ‘aid’ landscape, moving from a
paradigm of development assistance to one of
development cooperation mixed with investment.
However, the specific nature and impacts of these
engagements are still emerging.
This article has attempted to contribute to this
exploration through a presentation of the
discourse, justifications, and critiques
underpinning this cooperation. A more nuanced
understanding of Chinese motivations overseas
can build a more realistic understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of China’s own
agriculture models. For example, Chinese
researchers and policymakers acknowledge that
using agri-business investments as development
aid comes with risks and uncertainties. Even
though an enterprise approach can make
agriculture projects more financially secure,
integrating the non-profit and profit-making
functions remains a challenge. There is room for
dialogue around this approach, and need for
tools enabling Chinese companies to share
benefits with local communities.
As China’s agriculture engagements grow
throughout the continent, Chinese discourse has
contributed to a reframing of African agriculture
from degraded and hopeless, to a landscape of
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opportunity and promise. Characterised by a
Malthusian worldview of resource scarcity and a
crisis scenario about global food security,
Chinese narratives of African agriculture are
articulated around a critical assumption:
entitlement to environmental assets is directly
proportional to the capacity to produce with
them – and further, that the Chinese are the
most efficient users of agricultural resources.
With involvement of the Chinese in African
agriculture, the crisis scenario is thus replaced
with a new vision of harmony, with China and
Africa working together in a win-win project of
ecological modernisation.
This framing is further aided by increasing
disillusionment with the prevailing aid paradigm
in Africa, giving the opportunity for Chinese
actors to claim stewardship over agricultural
resources on the continent. Presented as a
politically neutral concern for the ‘common’
development needs shared by China and African
countries, the narratives are able to largely fence
out inconvenient questions, for example, about
problems with agriculture practices within
China, or unclear land tenure within African
countries. The assumption is that technical
interventions are needed to turn Africa’s
‘undervalued’ environmental potential into social
and economic benefit.
Despite some debate and criticism about Chinese
agriculture cooperation in Africa, this framing
works as a powerful narrative because it arrives at
a convenient point of convergence for the interests
of the central constituents in these engagements:
(1) Chinese leaders who stand to gain from
increased soft power in Africa; (2) African leaders
who will benefit both from increased agriculture
production and trade in their countries and from
positive relations with China as a rising power;
and (3) Global actors concerned about Africa’s
‘underdeveloped’ agriculture, which is understood
to require input from more efficient resource-
users. Those who are outsiders, such as risk-averse
Chinese investors, are being brought into the
circle through financial incentives and removal of
trade barriers. Researchers and civil society,
however, remain on the outside and are thus free
to ask critical questions of the dominant
narratives and underlying assumptions.
Despite the small number of informants, what
emerges from this exploration is a widely varied
set of interpretations of Chinese discourse on
China–Africa agriculture cooperation. We see
that cooperation is a dynamic process informed
and shaped by China’s sociocultural and
development history, the ongoing experiences of
individual actors in Africa, and personal
ambitions and dreams for the future. We see
creative thinking about how to solve problems
and improve on the engagements.
Perhaps then the paradigm shift in African
agriculture comes not from what China is doing
– or not doing – differently on the ground, but
rather, from a shift in how the world perceives
Africa’s agrarian future and China’s role in it.
However, it is still unclear how much China’s
discourse of opportunity will hold true for
African partners. The assumption that Africa’s
agriculture is undervalued and underdeveloped
begs the question, underdeveloped by whom? If
Africa’s agriculture potential is to be developed,
how is this potential defined and for whose
benefit? More research is needed problematising
China’s own agriculture development model and
its assumed success. While China has made
impressive progress towards increasing its total
food production, this has been achieved at the
cost of heavy depletion of its water and soil
resources, intense fertiliser use with associated
high pollution and energy use, and social
exclusion of large fractions of society. It remains
unclear whether the agriculture development
models being transferred in China’s
South–South exchanges will replicate these
problems in Africa.
Furthermore, if the Chinese model for
agriculture cooperation in Africa is to provide
technocratic inputs, there is a need to explore
more deeply to what degree cooperative partners
are able to adapt those tools to meet their needs.
Despite rhetoric of mutual benefit on both sides,
thus far, China has generally taken the lead in
agriculture project design and implementation
with only passive participation from African
partners. This has led to frustrations on both
sides, project failures, and unexpected
consequences on the ground (Buckley 2011).
There is particular excitement among
researchers and some practitioners around the
potential for emerging trilateral relationships to
address some of these problems, overcome
structural barriers and increase transparency;
however, very little empirical evidence exists to
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substantiate the claimed potential benefits of
these arrangements. Further exploration of how
the multiplicity of Chinese agriculture
cooperation modalities function on the ground in
specific contexts is needed.
Chinese assumptions about achievable food self-
sufficiency in developing countries shape China’s
policy framework for global agriculture aid, trade
and investments. Understanding the underlying
motivations can spur local countries to develop
their own vision for global food security and their
place in it, and to determine how best to engage
Chinese actors to achieve these goals. Whether
or not global Chinese agriculture activities
alleviate food security challenges, they are
certain to alter production and consumption
patterns of local farming communities around
the world. Without constructive and active
engagement, ‘mutual benefits’ will be likely to
remain confined to the Chinese and local elites –
at the expense of the local environment and
farming communities. Development actors (both
local and global), researchers and NGOs all have
a role to play in developing visions and policies
for global food security and sustainable agrarian
futures, and placing China’s increasing global
engagement within this framework.
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